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(L. A. No. 20878. In Bank. Nov. 110, 1949.]
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INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY (8 Corporation)::'
Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMIS8~'
SION. HAZEL PAULINE SPIDLE et aI., Responden~;
(1]] Workmen's Oompensation - W1I1'&Dce - Beformation.-Th.,
evidence authorized the Industrial Accident Commission ~;j
reform an individual-insured compensation policy replacing:!
a partncrship policy under which relatives of the partners ?
were not excluded, so as to extend the same eoverage to the~'
insured employer's relatives, where it appeared that the
ployer intended to order a policy with full eoverage for all .
his employees, and that there was to be a mere change in D&JDC!
of the insured from a partnership to the employer as the
succeeding individual owner.
[2] Id.-Insurance-E1fect of Assignment of Bmpl07er's BusinesS.
-Although a compensation insurance policy provided that , .
when the name of the insured was changed from a partnership .'{
to that of an individual succeeding partner, employees who .
were relatives of the individual insured would be excluded if . •.
not specially covered as such, yet Ins. Code, § 304, relating .
to transfers by a partner, indicates that the "interest in the"

em...:'.

[1) See 14 Oal.Jur. 454; 29 Am.Jur. 114.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 253.1;
[2,5J Workmen's Compensation, § 254; [3] Insurance, § 53; [4]
Workmen's COlllpensation, § 255.
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insurance" passes when one partner buys out the others, and
that interest should embrace the character of the employees
covered; hence the individual succeeding partner is entitled
to assume that a mere change in the name of the insured from
the partnership to him would not limit the protection he
theretofore had, and intended to have in the new policy.
(3) Insurance - Oontract - Beformation. - Where an insured requests an existing but expiring policy to be renewed, no change
may be made in the terms of the renewal policy without notice
to the insured.
('J Workmen'. Oompenaation- Iuurance-Bstoppel.-An illS1JJ'o
ance company was not entitled to annulment of an award of
the Industrial Accident Commission reforming and enforcing
an individual-insured compensation policy which replaced a
partnership policy covering all employees of the partnership,
and under which a widow of a deceased son-in-law of the employer was allowed death benefits, although the new policy,
like the old one, provided that if the policy was issued to an
"individual" the individual's relatives were not covered, where
the insurer should have anticipated that the insured, a former
partner who bought out the other partner's interust in the
partnership business, would believe that his relatives would
not be excluded by such purchase, the insurance broker who
collected the premiums was aware of the presence of the sonin-law's name on the insured's payroll, the premiums were
paid to and retained by the insurer, and the insurer did not
deliver the individual policy until some time after the son-inlaw's fatal accident.
[6] ld.-Insuranee-Ueet of Assignment of Bmpl07er's BuaiJleB8.
-Under Ins. Code, § 304, a partnership compensation policy
which covered a partner's son-in-law employed by the firm
continued the coverage and rendered it effective on behalf
of such partner, even after such partner had bought out the
other partner's interest, where the policy had not expired and
had not been terminated by the parties at the time of the
eon-in-law's death.

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Accident Commission awarding compensation for death. Award
affirmed.
Herlihy & Herlihy and E. Hubert Herlihy for Petitioner.
T. Groezinger and John A. Rowe, Jr., for Respondents.
i

CARTER, J.-Petitioner, insurance company, seeks an an-:
Dulment of an award of respondent commission reforming and,'
I
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enforcing as reformed a workmen's compensation ;na·" ....
policy, whereby the widow of the deceased workman,a .
tive of the employer, was allowed death benefits.
Prior to August I, 1946, R. C. Cornish and Roland '.
Schultz were 'partners in a business venture. A policy
workmen's compensation insurance was issued to the nA'~n _~.
ship and to the partners jointly but not severally, ruJnDllIlglI
from January 22, 1946, to January 22, 1947,covering all
their employees. On the subject of whether relatives
excluded, the policy provided that if a partner$hip was
insured it would not include partners but nothing was
as to relatives of the partners. With respect to relatives,
provided that if the policy is issued to an "individual"
such individual's relatives are not covered. Schultz, n .. " ... nn' '''
sold his interest in the business to Cornish in July, 1946,
new policy was issued by the petitioner dated January
1947, but covering the period August 1, 1946, to August
1947, and presumably ' the partnership policy was .,.....'''.,1,.,'-&.
The new policy ran to Cornish as an individual and the clauses
with respect to relatives were the same as in the partnership
policy. Thus it could be reasoned that as long as the insured
was a partnership, the employees of the partnership would
not be excluded even though related to one of the partners, .
but when an individual was the insured, his relatives are excluded. This presents the question of the extent to which .
the coverage was intended to be affected by the change of the
insured from a partnership to Cornish alone, the individual, '
when the arrangement was made for the cancellation of the
partnership policy to be replaced by an individual-insured .
policy. That is to say, was it contemplated that the change
from a partnership insured to an individual insured would
affect only the name in which the policy was to stand, or was
it to go farther and bring into operation the clauses that excluded relatives when the insured was an individual rather
than a partnership t
The circumstances surrounding the issuance of the above
mentioned policies are as follows: The partnership was dissolved on August 1, 1946, and notices of such dissolution were
sent to all persons with whom the partners had dealt, including petitioner, and Clarence Haugen. Haugen was an insurance broker who procured the partnership policy for the partnership. While in such capacity he was the agent for the
partnership, and later, for Cornish in connection with the
procurement of the insurance. There is evidence from which
,ft
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it may be inferred that he was petitioner's agent for the collection of premiums on policies inasmuch as the invoices or
bills for premiums from petitioner stated that Cornish should
pay the premiums to "your agent" Haugen. On October 23,
1946, Mrs. Cornish, the wife of Cornish, who acted as his bookkeeper and who handled all his insurance matters, called on
Haugen to make out payroll reports and see about the change
of name resulting from the partnership dissolution. At that
time, Spidle, Cornish'8 son-in-law, and his son, Arthur Cornish, were employed by Cornish, and Haugen was aware of
the relationship and employment. (There is a conflict on that
subject but the evidence clearly establishes it.) The system of
arranging for premiums in workmen's compensation insurance contemplates a payment by the insured at the time the
policy is ordered. Thereafter, at periodic intervals, sometimes
monthly, the insured makes a payroll report to the insurer
which shows his employees and compensation received. On
the basis of these reports the premiuni is computed and a
statement sent to the insured. There may be a credit in favor
of either the insurer or insured depending upon the relation
of the figures arrived at by the computation and the initial
deposit. Haugen assisted in preparing the reports for August
and September, 1946, and the premiums for those months
were paid to Haugen. Spidle was listed by name on the payroll and it may be inferred Haugen knew of the presence of
his name thereon. Haugen, being doubtful as to how the
change in the named insured should be accomplished, telephoned petitioner's office and was advised by a Mr. Furbush
that the partnership policy should be sent in for cancellation
and the insurance would be rewritten to name Cornish alone
as the insured and dated back to August I, 1946.
In the Report of Referee (Report of Record) dated April
22, 1947, we find this statement: "When the witness [Mrs.
Cornish] left the broker's [Haugen's] office after having left
with him for cancellation the old compensation and liability
policy on the partnership, and arranging for the issuance of
a new policy in their stead, the witness remarked to the broker
in substance, 'I have nothing to show now that we are insured.
are we fully covered" The broker replied in substance, 'Yes.
you are fully covered. don't worry.' The broker had said that
he would write a new policy as of Aug. 1. 1946. The broker
hail been introduced to the neff'nnant's [Cornish's] SOD,
Arthur, and the decedent as the defendant's son-in-law on
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the Sunday in January when he first came to· their house in
connection with writing the policy on the partnership." The
petitioner stresses the theory that Mrs. Cornish intended to
order exactly the same type of policy, with the exception of a
change in name from a partnership to an individual insured.
It appears quite obvious that the employer intended to order
a policy naming him as individual insured with full covrrage
for all his employees. Much importance is attached to the provision in the original policy declaring that certain relatives
are excluded if the insured is an individual. This would
seem to be most unimportant since that policy was issued to a
partnership under the terms of which such relat1ves were not
excluded. It would seem that what Mrs. Cornish intended to
order was a policy extending the same coverage under a different name.
Haugen, at the time Mrs. Cornish took in the old policy
for cancellation, called Furbush, admittedly an agent of the
defendant carrier, to ascertain the manner in which the
matter should be handled. Petitioner states, in its briefs,
that Haugen" may have been" its agent for collection of premiums, and that Hangen "was its agent for collection," but
it is denied that he was an agent for the purpose of effecting
or extending coverage, yet it is admitted that the oral agreement, made by Haugen with Mrs. Cornish, to the effect that
the policy of insurance would be retroactive from August 1,
1946, is valid. Haugen then sent a letter to petitioner in
which he stated that the partnership policy should be canceled as of August 1, 1946, because of "change of entity" of
the insured; that the policy should be "rewritten" effective
August 1, 1946, naming Cornish as an individual, as insured;
and that enclosed were checks, one for $29.75 for the balance
of premium due on partnership policy, and one for $54.21,
for premiums on the policy to be "rewritten" according to
payroll report for August 1. 1946, to October 1, 1946. No
word was heard from petitioner nnti! J annary 17th or 20th,
1947, when the rewritten policy was finally received by Cornish. This was after the accident occurred (Dec. 10, 1946)
in which Spidle lost his life. After that accident, there being
some doubt about the coverage of the policy, Haugen communicated with petitioner, and, as a result, a rider appeared on the
policy when finally received which specifically named Arthur
Cornish as covered althongh a son of Cornish. Petitioner
made no offer to return the preminm collected on a payroll
with Spidle's name on it either before or after the accident.
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[1] Petitioner contends that the evidence is insufficient to
establish reformation. We believe that from all of thE' circumstances and the statutory law a ease is made for insuTs.nce
coverage by petitioner. It is clear tbat the only thing sought
to be achieved by Cornish waa the change in the name of the
insured from a partnership to bim as the succeeding individual
owner. Certainly he did not contemplate that the coverage
of his policy was to be reduced by such change. He wanted
just as fuU protection as be had before.' The change in name
was a mere formality. The circumstances present a situation
peculiarly within the spirit of the statutory law. Hln tbe case
of partners, joint owners, or owners in common, who are
jointly insured, a transfer of interest by one to another thereof
does not avoid insurance, even thougb it· bas been agreed that
the insurance shalJcease upon an alienation of the subject
insured" (Ins. Code, § 804:), and the cases holding thereunder
that an insurer is liable for an injury to the employee of an
individual, wbo was formerly a partner in a partnership. covered by insurance, the business of wbich partnprsbip be has
acquired and no change in name waa made after the dil!80lution of the partnership. (First Nat.T . .t 8. Bank v. IMustrial Acc. Com., 213 Cal. 822 (2 ,P.2d 347. 78 A.L;R. 1324] i
National etc. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com .• 29 Cal.App.2d 836
[84 P.2d 2011 ; see Reed v. Indu.strial Ace, Com.• 10 Cal.2d
191 [73 P.2d 1212, 114 A.L.R. 720].) The case of Ocean
A . .t G. Corp~ v.Industrial Acc. Com., 104 Cal.App. 34 [285 P. .
7071 is not controlling, for it holds that where. in a workmen'a .
compensation policy, a partnership is the tnsned and the
partners are not covered, the dissolution of the partnership
and ensuing employment of the retiring partner by the individual continuing the business is not covered by the policy
reason of aection 2557 of the Civil Code, the predecessor of
section 304: of e nsurance
•
there created which would operate as a trap for the unwary. !
[2] While it is !lrue that a careful reading of the policy would :
show that when the name of the insured was changed from
partnel'fthip to that of. an individual succeeding partner, employees who were relatives of the individual insured would be
excluded, if not specially covered as such, yet section 304 of
the Insurance Code, supra, indicates that the lCinterest in the'
insurance" passes when one partner buys out the others. That
interest should embrace the character of the employees coveredI
Cornisb was justified in assuming that thE' mere change ir
name would not limit the full protection he theretofore ha(

I

I
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and intended to have in the new poliey. Petitioner's _,!'!1'tiin
that Haugen's knowledge was Cornish's knowledge, and
fact that Haugen testified that he knew a poliey issued to
individual insured did not cover relatives unless 80 8J)E!Cllile
is not significant, for it would not necessarily follow that
nish knew that a mere change in name of the insured __ ,_w __
have such effect. Haugen contacted the insurer and no
problem was mentioned. Furthermore, the credibility of '
testimony was for the commission. It will be reJneJnbereJ
that Haugen communicated with petitioner's ofticeas to
mode of procedure when a partnership sells to one of the
ners, but was not advised of the effect on the character of
employees covered by the policy by the change of the
of the insured.
There is some analogy to the renewal eases in the ... _.__......
expressed by section 304 of the Insurance Code. [3]
an insured requests an existing but expiring poliey to be
newed, no change may be made in the terms of the ,..-.::.IJ,.,WADJI
policy without notice, to the insured. (Connecticut Pire
Co. v. OakleylmprotJed Bldg. ct L. Co., 80 F.2d 717; Uuach~"~l
Parish Police Jury v. Northern 1m. Co. (La.App.), 176
639.) As above seen, the policy may be interpreted to
that a change in the name of the insured would result in
change of the employees covered. That is not true in the
newalcases, but here we have more. [4:] The ne1iti4)neir-ilIl1'l
surer should have anticipated that Cornish would
that his relatives would not be excluded by his nu:rchase[~
of the partnership. Haugen was the agent for the in!!,nr.~l11
in the collection of premiums and it may be said that by
proc,ess he became aware of the presence of Spidle's name
the payroll, inasmuch as the premiums are based on the
roll. He knew Spidle was a relative. The premiums
were based on the payroll containing Spidle's name were
to and retained by petitioner. This has BOme signifiiC&lncei';l
even though such premium would not be enough to
Spidle as a relative of Cornish, when we consider that Spidle
pay should not form any part of the basis for the premium
if the policy did not cover him at aU because of his relation-,
ship to Cornish, and, further, that petitioner did not even'"
deliver a policy until about three months after it was applied "
for, and some time after Spidle's fatal accident.
'
[5] Petitioner relies upon such cases as Westerfeld v. New'
York Life 1m. Co., 129 Cal. 68 [58 P. 92, 61 P. 667] ; Sharman
v. Continental 1m. Co., 167 Cal. 117 [138 P. 708,52 L.R.A.N.S.

)
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670] j Cayford v. Metropolitan lAfe 1m. Co., 5 Cal.A.pp. 715
[91 P. 266], and Hargett v. (h,lf 1m. 00.,12 Cal.App.2d 449
[55 P.2d 1258], for the proposition that knowledge of a soliciting agent is not the knowledge of the iIi.surer. The extent or
nature of the application of such a rule is not clear (aee Banker's Indem.Ins. 00. v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 4 Cal.2d 89 [47
P.2d 719] ; National Auto. ct Oal. 00. v. Industrial Ace. Oom.,
ante, p. 20 [206 P.2d 841]), but in any event it would
not be of any significance when section 304 of the Insurance
Code is considered. Under the circumstances of this ease,
that section continued the coverage and rendered it effective
at the time .the liability for compensation arose, that is, the
Insurance Code provision preserved the coverage although one
of the partners bought the other's interest, and the award is
sustainable on that ground.
The award is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., ~ncurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-8ection 304 of the Insurance Code (formerly Civ. Code, § 2557) provides: "In the case of partners,
joint owners, or owners in common, who are jointly insured,
a transfer of int.erest by one to another thereof does not avoid
insuranc.e, even though it has been agreed that the insurance
shall cease upon an alienation of the subject insured."
Under this section a partnership policy of workmen'. compensation insurance is continued on behalf of an individual
expartner after dissolution of the partnership ('m NatWnal
T. ct 8. Bank v. IndttStrial Ace. Oom., 213 Cal. 322 [2 P.2d
347, 78 A.L.R. 1324]; NatioMl Auto. 1m. Co. v. IfKlulfrial
Ace. Oom., 29 Cal.App.2d 336 [84 P.2d 201]) ; thus dissolution
does not entail a forfeiture of the insurance. What is the coverage of the insurance contract while it is so continued' The
language of the code-" a transfer of interest . .• does not
avoid (the contract of]· insurance"-leads to the conclusion
that the insurance coverage before partnership dissolution is
continued by section 304 at least so long as the policy does not
expire or is not terminated by the parties. Under section 304,
the insurance held by the partners was not avoided by the
transfer from Schultz to Cornish of his interest in the partnership. To ascertain what protection continues after disso*Inll11rallce is cleAned 1n IOctiOD 22.lD8urance Oode, .. "a ecmuac'
whereb7 •• I'
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lution, one need inquire only which employees were covered by"
the contract between the partners and the cOlllpany. All four,
employees of the partnership, including Spidle, were covered
by the irulurance, for the clause of the policy excluding rela:
tives was irrelevant to that contract.
:'
In the only case dealing expressly with the coverage of ,.
contract continued under section 304, Ocean A. cf G. Corp. ,::
Industrwl Ace. Com., 104 Cal.App. 34 [285 P. 7071, the con~
tinuation-of-partnership-contract interpretation, was adoptea'
by the court and resulted in restriction of the insurer's ~'
bility. The court was confronted with a dis.'iolved partnership'
and a claim by one who was formerly a partner but only ~
employee of his expartner when injured. The policy issued
to the partners, which remained unchanged after dissolution,
of the partnership, provided that ., this policy shall not apply,
to any member of such partnership . . •" The court held that.
the injured expartner employee was not covered by the policy
even after the change in the partnership. He was not covered '
when the contract was made, and the policy issued to the:
partnership continued without change under section 304.'
Spidle'S case is simply the converse situation. Since he was
covered when the contract was made, he was covered during :
the period of its continuance under section 304.
The controlling question therefore is whether that policy:
was cancelled before the injury resulting in Spidle'8 death.,
It is my opinion that the submission of the policy to the COlD-,'
pany did not result in cancellation, for cancellation was con~"
ditional on the continued existence of insurance protectinB
the employer.
Haugen telephoned the insurance company and inquired , '
about the proper procedure to follow in changing the business'
entity on the policy. He was instructed to send in the old',
policy for cancellation and was told that a new policy would.
then be issued, to be effective retroactively. It is unquestioned i"
that both parties intended the employer to have the benefit
of insurance during the interim the new policy was in prepara-;
tion. Since Cornish was protected by section 304 under the
original policy, cancellation would have been for the sole bene- ;!
fit of the insurer as well as at its direction. I cannot believe ~
that either party contemplated cancellation apart from thej
effective creation of a new contract of insurance.
i
After noting that contract negotiation must be judged ob- :
jectively by the manifestationR of the parties, the diBSenting )
opinion relies on the legal conclusion of Haugen'8 secretary;
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that "We cancelled Mrs. Cornish'. old insurance policy .•. "
even though the opinion thereafter shows at length that Haugen was not the company'. agent and could not cancel the
policy. A letter from Haugen is also quoted as a manifestation of an intent to cancel. uThe letter, directed to the insurer, reads: cRe: #546-07595-R.C. Cornish & Schultz DBA
Cornish & Schultz, Crane Co.
Please cancell [Sic] policy dective 8-1-46 as there baa
been a change of entity. • • .
Please rewrite this policy dectil'e 8-1-46 as follows:
B. O. Cornish, an individual, DBA R. O.Cornish
Crane Service. . • .
.
Enclosed find check of net to col'erpayroll audit on
B. O. Oornish from 8-1-46 to 10-1-46... .'''
This letter does indicate an intent to cancel. But in addi.
tion, it manifests the request of the cancelling party for in·
surance that would be effective on August 1, 1946. The objective theory of contracts properly limits our inquiry to the
manifestations by the parties of their intent, but does not
preclude consideration of the acts and words of the principals
in the light of their obvious purposes. In that light, it is clear
that Cornish's consent to cancellation and Haugen's authority
to cancel were granted on condition that a contract of insur·
ance would be in existence at the moment the old coverage
ceased. (K. C. Working C. Co. v. EUf'eka--8,cunty P. ff Il.
Ins. Co., 82 Cal.App.2d 120 [185 P.2d 832] ; Poor v. Hudson
1m. Co., 2 F. 432; Holden. v. Putnam F. Ins. Co., 46 N.Y. 1
[7 Am.Rep. 287]; Aetna 1m. Co. v. B03en'b'f'g, 62 Ark. 507
[36 S.W. 908].)
There was no new contract at the time of Spidle'. death
because there was no agreement about the extent of coverage.
Cornish had only four employees. He never agreed or author·
ized Haugen to agree to coverage of only half of his work
force. The dissenting opinion states: "In the absence of
fraud, one who accepts an instrument which on its face is a
contract, is deemed to assent to all of its terms, and he cannot
escape liability upon the ground that he has not read it."
But Cornish did not receive the instrument that purported
to represent his contract with the insurer until weeks after the
fatal accident. The dissent also points to the original policy
issued to the partnership. U There was ample opportunity
for Cornish to examine the limitation in the first policy. which
was the same standard form used in specifying the new coverage. " But Cornish could not have been certain on October

610

INDusTRIAL INDEM. Co. tI. IND. Aoo. CoM.

[84 C.2c1.

23, 1946, that the "same standard form" used to insure the,
partnership would be issued to him on January 17, 1947.'
Moreover, I cannot agree that the use by an insurer of a multiple-purpose form, with clauses in the alternative for different factual situations, can bind one formerly insured to knowlt!dge of all the clauses in the policy totally irrelevant to the
contract evidenced by the policy. If Cornish knew any clause
in the old policy, it was the one stating, in bold type, "Failure
to secure the payment of full compensation benefits to ALL
EMPLOYEES is a misdemeanor."
Cornish paid premiums for
four employees and never manifested consent .to be insured
for any smaller number.
It is difficult to ascertain what intent the insurer manifested
concerning the issuance of a new policy. Once it is assumed
that Haugen was not the insurer's agent, the only link to the
insurance company is found in the telephone conversation
that Haugen had with Mr. Furbush, presumably an agent of
the company. No testimony of any agent capable of binding
the company appears in the record. Because we have only the
fragmentary report of the conversation by Mrs. Cornish, it
would be unreasonable to assume that the insurance company
had done anything but consent to its customary contra~t of
insurance with an individual, under which relatives of the
insured are excluded.
Since the parties never agreed on the coverage of the insurance, no new contract existed at the time of Spidle's death.
The condition for cancellation was therefore not fulfilled.
(E. C. Working O. 00. v. Eureka-Security P • .. M. Ins. Co.,
82 Cal.App.2d 120 [185 P.2d 8321; Tarleton v. DeYfJutle, 113
F.2d 290 [32 A.L.R. 3431 (Cal.App. 9th).} Since the partnership policy, which covered Spidle and was continued under
section 304, was not cancelled at the time of his death, the
award must be affirmed.
In affirming the award, it must be recognized that the Industrial Accident Commission ordered the reformation of a
contract to which the parties never agreed. The prohlem is
academic, however, since the company is liable under the partnership policy for the amount of the award. The company
was not prejudiced by the award of reformation hecause the
new policy as issued on January 17, 1947, did cover the only
8urviving employee-relative. In any event, the policy that
the commission erroneously attempted to reform has expired.
Spence, J " concurred.
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EDMONDS, J.-I cannot agree that section 304 of the Insurance Code "continued the coverage {of the policy origi.·
nally written by the insurer] and rendered it effective at the
time the liability for compensation arose." That policy, it
appears without conflict, was delivered to the insurer for cm;.
cellation before the accident to Spidle occurred. The evidence
also shows the acceptance by the insurer of coverage to reo
place that of the cancelled policy, the new insurance being
written as ordered by the agent of the insured.
According to the majority opinion, "Haugen was an insur·
ance broker who procured the partnership policy for the partnership. While in such capacity he was the agent for the
partnership, and later, for Cornish in connection with the procurement of the insurance." Schultz sold his interest in the
business to Cornish in July and the partnership was dissolved
on August 1st. Evidently nothing was done about the insur·
ance until October when Mrs. Cornish and Haugen discussed
the policy which was then in effect. He telephoned Furbush
of the insurance company for instructions. Furbush stated
that it would be necessary to cancel the old policy and write
anew one.
The telephone call was made in Mrs. Cornish's presence,
and she left the policy written for the partnership with Haugen
for cancellation. Anne Kodak, secretary to Haugen, testified
that "We cancelled Mrs. Cornish's old insurance policy . • •
and I mailed in the old policy with the check for the new premium and payroll report at that time."
A letter identified as having been written by Haugen im·
mediately after the interview with Mrs. Cornish fully cor·
roborates the t~timony as to the cancellation of the partnership policy. The letter, directed to the insurer, reads:
"Re: #546·07595·R.C. Cornish & Schultz DBA Cornish &
Schultz, Crane Co.
Please cancel policy effective 8·1-46 as there has been
a change of entity. . . . and .•• rewrite this policy
effective 8-1-46 as follows:
R. C. Cornish, an individual, DBA R. C. Cornish
Crane Service. . . .
Enclosed find check of net to cover payroll audit on
R. C. Cornish from 8·1-46 to 10·1-46. . . . "
.
Unquestionably the insurer accepted these instructions from
Haugen and changed its coverage accordingly. As stated in
the majority opinion, "presumably [the original policy] was
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cancelled. " Although the new policy reached Haugen
Spidle was killed, nevertheless there is evidence that it
.
issued prior to the accident and had been mailed to Haugen,'
i Mrs. Cornish, as the agent for her husband, manifested her
consent to the terms of the new policy by authorizing HaugeD,'
to request the insurer to cancel the then existing insurance
and rewrite the policy effective as of August 1st in the name
of R. C. Cornish, an individual, doing business as R. C. Cor··
nish Crane Service. She was present during Haugen's tel~
phone conversation with the insurer, and made no objecti _.
to having the new insurance issued to her husband u an inc1i'
vidual.
Her state of mind is immaterial (Zurich
Auur.Oo. 'f,'jIndu3friol Ace. Oom., 132 Cal.App. 1.01, 104 [22 P.2d 572])1
.'
Objectively, both the insured and thil insurer manifested co~
sent to the issuance of the new policy. The insured cannot be",
excused upon the ground that the terms of the policy were,,%)
not read. There was ample opportunity for Cornish to ex~ I
amine the limitation in the
policy, which was the
standard form used in specifying the new coverage. In the.'
absence of fraud, one who accepts an instrument which on its . .
face is a contract, is deemed to assent to all of its terms, and -.•
he cannot escape liability upon the ground that he has not 1"
read it (Gretle v. Taft Realty 00., 101 Cal.App. 343, 352
[281P. 641]). There would be no point whatsoever in stating .
the terms of an insurance policy. if its conditions and limita- ::
tion may be vitiated, as suggested in the majority opinion, by .~
the insured's inquiry: "Are we fully covered'" If that
were the law, an affirmative answer to such a question mightsubject the insurer to liability for fire, theft, burglary or other ;i
hazards in • policy the terms of which included no such cover- j
age.
"
Although the majority opinion does not expressly
that Haugen was the agent of the insurer with general powers
and to such an extent as to make his knowledge imputable tos
the company, the decision is impliedly placed upon that :j
ground. As a basis for affirming the award it is said: "There ~
is evidence from which it may be inferred that he was peti•.
tioner's agent lor the coIJeetion of premiums on policies in... :
much as the invoices or bills for premiums from petitioner .~
.stated that Cornish should pay the premiums to 'your agent '.~
Haugen." But until this time it would seem to have been 1
settled that an agent for collection of premiums is not an .~
agent for coverage or other purposes. (Detroit T. 00. 'f. {
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Transcontinental Ins. Co., 105 Cal.App. 395 [287 P. 535];
Parrish v. Rosebud M. ~ M. Co., 140 Cal. 635 [74 P. 312] ;
Bennett v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 84 Cal.App. 130 [257 P.
586].) It is a general rule, apart from controlling factual
variations, that an insurance broker is the agent of the insured "for the purpose of procuring the policy and the insurer only in order to receive and transmit the premiums."
(Overland Sales Co. v. American lndem. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.),
256 S.W. 980, 982; 16 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice
[1944] § 8725.) "It is also the general rule tIl.t the knowledge of a broker as to facts or matters pertaining to the risk,
while imputable to the insured, is not imputabZe 10 the insurer." (16 Appleman, supra, § 8730, p. 163; Ben Franklin
Ins. Co. v. Weary, 4 Ill.App. 74; Reser v. Southern Kans. Mut.
Ins. Co., 150 Kan. 58 [91 P.2d 25, 28]; BoneweZZ v. NOrth
American Ace. Ins. Co., 167 Mich. 274 [132 N.W. 1067, Ann.
Cas. 1913A 847]; Fire Assn. of Pua v. American Cement
Plaster Co., 37 Tex.Civ.App. 629 [84 S.W. 1115].) Haugen
was not an agent of the insurer; he was a broker, and his incidental function of collecting the premiums upon insurance
procured by him was not sufficient to charge the insurer with
his knowledge for any purpose whatever. Everything which
he did in connection with the cancellation of the partnership
policy and the procurement of the second policy was in his
capacity as the agent of Cornish.
Under these circumstances there is no factual basis whatever for affirming the award upon the ground that section 304
of the Insurance Code governs the rights of the parties.
The statute is inapplicable where, as here, the iuitial insurance policy is replaced by a subsequent one. The background
and basic purpose of the code section clearly demonstrate that
it was never intended to continue an insurance agreement in
effect when the original coverage is replaced by a subsequent
contract.
A basic rule in the insurance field is that an insurance contract is ". . . considered to be personalized in its risks,
involving the moral hazard of possible destruction by the
insured, risks of carelessness or neglect, and the courts are
reluctant to require the companies to assume dangers not contemplated, and to require them to protect persons with whom
no contract was ever made. Being such a personal contract, it
is avoided by a sale of the insured property." (4 Appleman,
M C.Id-U
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Insurance Law and Practice lHJ41j, § 2741, p.. 629, citing
Lyford v. Connecticl£t Fire Ins. Co., .99 :\Ie. 273 [58 A. 916]
alll) Llllison v. Nat'ional Union F,:re Ins. Co., 163 Tenn. 246
~43 S.W.2d 202].)
However, the rule has been qualified to
the extent that". . . where a change in title is merely nominal; and not such as would increase a motive to burn the
property or to decrease safeguards surrounding it, the provision [rendering the policy void is] . . . not ... violated."
(4 Appleman, supra, at p. 632, citing Forward v. Continental
Ins. Co., 142 N.Y. 382 [37 N.E. 615].) Thus, although public
policy in general favors the absolute avoidance of insurance
when the· property is alienated, the courts have refused to
apply the rule when the alienation is nominal or essentially so,
as in the case of a conveyance from one partner to another,
or in the case of dissolution of partnership.
Section 304 reads: "Transfer by partner. In the case of
partners, joint owners, or owners in common, who are jointly
insured, a transfer of interest by one to another thereof does
not avoid insurance, even though it has been agreed that the
insurance shall cease upon an alienation of the subJect insured. " By another statute, insurance is defined as ". . . . a
contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against
loss. damage, or liability arising from a contingent or unknown
event." (Ins. Code, § 22.) Applying this definition to section 304, it reads: "In the case of partners . . . who are
jointly insured, a transfer of intercst by onc to another thereof
does not avoid [the contract of] insurance, even though it has
been agreed that the [contract undertaking the indemnification] . . . shall cease upon an alienation of the subject insured." Its principal purpose is to prevent the avoidance
of insurance upon alienation of the subject matter in the case
of dissolution of a partnership. The section was not intended
to abolish the familiar contract rule that a contract is rendered
ineffective by mutual consent when it is replaced by a subsequent contract dealing with the same subject matter and containing terms inconsistent with those of the original agreement. The new policy expressly excluded Spidle from its
coverage by providing: "If this policy is issued to an individual ... it is agreed that; anything in this policy to the
contrary notwithstanding, this policy does not insure: As
respects injuries (or death resulting therefrom) sustained by
any of the following relatives of the employer, i. e., . . . sonin-law ... unless such relative is specifically named in item
(III) of the Declarations or specifically insured by Endorse-

---_.--------------------------

ment attached to this policy." Spidle was not named in iteJll
(III) nor was he included in the coverage by endorsement.
For these reasons, in my opinion, the award should be annulled.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied December 29, 1949. Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing.
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